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Abstract In various documents the view emerges that
contemporary biotechnosciences are currently experiencing
a scientific revolution: a massive increase of pace, scale
and scope. A significant part of the research endeavours
involved in this scientific upheaval is devoted to under-
standing and, if possible, ameliorating humankind: from
our genomes up to our bodies and brains. New develop-
ments in contemporary technosciences, such as synthetic
biology and other genomics and ‘‘post-genomics’’ fields,
tend to blur the distinctions between prevention, therapy
and enhancement. An important dimension of this devel-
opment is ‘‘biomimesis’’: i.e. the tendency of novel tech-
nologies and materials to mimic or plagiarize nature on a
molecular and microscopic level in order to optimise
prospects for the embedding of technological artefacts in
natural systems such as human bodies and brains. In this
paper, these developments are read and assessed from a
psychoanalytical perspective. Three key concepts from
psychoanalysis are used to come to terms with what is
happening in research laboratories today. After assessing
the general profile of the current revolution in this manner,
I will focus on a particular case study, a line of research
that may serve as exemplification of the vicissitudes of
contemporary technosciences, namely viral biomaterials.
Viral life forms can be genetically modified (their genomes
can be rewritten) in such a manner that they may be
inserted in human bodies in order to produce substances at
specific sites such as hormones (testosterone), neurotrans-
mitters (dopamine), enzymes (insulin) or bone and muscle
tissue. Notably, certain target groups such as top athletes,
soldiers or patients suffering from degenerative diseases
may become the pioneers serving as research subjects for
novel applications. The same technologies can be used for
various purposes ranging from therapy up to prevention
and enhancement.
Keywords Psychoanalysis of science  Genomics 
Synthetic biology  Biomimesis  Viral biomaterials
[My life] happened to coincide with the most dramatic burst of knowledge
in the whole history of mankind… Life itself has yielded its secrets, its
central mechanisms have been unravelled in intimate detail and its history
has been probed back to [its] origin…
Introduction
The lines quoted above were taken from an autobio-
graphical retrospect by Nobel Prize laureate Christian de
Duve entitled Life evolving (De Duve 2002, p. vii). They
convey a conviction, voiced in countless similar documents
as well, and ubiquitously present in journals such as Nature
and Science, that we are witnessing a scientific revolution
of breathtaking dimensions, the scope and impact of which
is comparable to those of previous epistemic upheavals,
notably the one that irreversibly transformed the processes
of scientific knowledge production in the 17th century. In
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the life sciences, the tale of the current revolution has
evolved into a grand narrative. The recent quantum leap in
knowledge, the narrative tells us, while building on the
groundbreaking insights of Darwin and Mendel midway
the nineteenth century, was heralded by the discovery of
the structure of DNA by Watson and Crick in 1953, to be
crowned by the completion of the sequencing of the human
genome in 2000–2003. Indeed, sequencing the genomes of
an exponentially growing number of species is among its
core activities. Building on these previous milestones, the
revolution still moves ahead, however, so that presently,
we are entering the so-called post-genomics era, with
synthetic biology as one of the new major frontiers of
laboratory life. Whereas genomics was about ‘‘reading’’
and deciphering genomes—as the ‘‘scores’’ or the ‘‘Rosetta
Stones’’ of life—synthetic biology is rather about re-writ-
ing or recomposing them, about writing DNA, using the
bio-molecular alphabet nature herself has produced during
the early days of evolution. This opens up broad vistas for
societal innovation, or (to paraphrase a famous title of
Friedrich Engels): what used to be mere ‘‘utopia’’ is
increasingly becoming hard ‘‘science’’ (Zwart 2009).
In all these developments, a plethora of promises for
society are entailed. When on June 26 2000, during their
famous Press Conference, President Clinton, together with
Francis Collins and Craig Venter, solemnly announced,
from the East Room of the White House, that the grand
effort to sequence the human genome—the Human Gen-
ome Project (HGP)—was rapidly nearing its completion,
one of the most notorious claims made on the occasion was
that ‘‘Our children’s children will know the term cancer
only as a constellation of stars’’.1 In other words, due to the
current revolution in the life sciences, notably human
genomics, cancer would soon be something of the past.
Now, 11 years later, this rhetoric of promises strikes us as
poignantly over-optimistic. In April 2010, the journal
Nature devoted a special issue to assessing the outcomes of
the HGP, ‘‘ten years after’’ as it were. In his own retrospect,
Francis Collins, now Director of NIH, one of the world’s
leading funding agencies for biomedical research, asked
the question ‘‘Has the revolution arrived?’’ (Collins 2010).
His answer was: ‘‘Not yet’’. The basic outcome of the HGP
is that life is much more complicated that was expected
when the grand endeavour was launched in 1990 (Cf. ‘‘Life
is complicated’’, Hayden 2010). Yet, the promises incited
by genomics, notably for human health, are still in the air,
at times even in amplified versions. They are simply
transferred to newly emerging post-genomics fields, such
as personalised genomics and synthetic biology. After
deciphering the genome of humankind as such, the per-
sonal genome (i.e. the famous $ 1000 genome) is now
about to make its appearance, to enter the stage, while in the
near future, we will increasingly be able to re-write (rather
than only read) the genetic scores of living beings, to re-
compose the ‘‘music of life’’ (Noble 2006), reshuffling or
reassembling its building-blocks, its notes and chords.
This is a telling example of what Sigmund Freud in The
Interpretation of Dreams has called ‘‘displacement’’
(‘‘Verschiebung’’, 1900/1942). The high expectations are
still there, but they are transferred from the original object
(the HGP) to alluring substitutes currently emerging, such
as synthetic biology or personal genomics. The implication
of this observation is not that the expectations involved
should be simply discarded as science rhetoric, employed
by research managers in their frantic search for novel
streams of funding to keep their research teams alive in
their perennial struggle for survival. Rather, in principle,
these claims should be taken quite seriously. They are
symptomatic of the desires that continue to fuel our con-
temporary will to know. Thus, the language of promises
and expectations contains important cues for revealing and
understanding the complex psychosocial dynamics of the
research processes involved.
The HGP press conference was an instance of ‘‘science
theatre’’ no doubt. The real-life daily plodding of scientists
off stage, in less visible environments, carried out by whole
armies of virtually anonymous (and often very young)
researchers at work in laboratory settings, is driven by
other, probably more mundane and less dramatic motives
than the ones voices by Clinton, Collins and Venter as their
science managers in command. Indeed, the distance
between the picture presented by these elderly key pro-
tagonists ‘‘on stage’’ on the one hand, and the real world of
science on the other, is likely to be quite considerable. Yet,
precisely for this reason, we may see the press conference
as a fascinating event, namely as an instance of what Freud,
again in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900/1942), has
called ‘‘Verdichtung’’ (condensation). Ideas and motives
that tend to be present in research practices in a more or
less subliminal, fragmented and distributed manner, diluted
to such a degree that the researchers involved are usually
hardly aware of them, are suddenly articulated and brought
forward in a highly condensed and tangible form, as a
highly symbolical focus event: a dream-like occasion (a
brightly glittering press conference), as a scientific dream
come true. On such a splendid occasion, the latent web of
loosely associated, diffuse ideas becomes suddenly discrete
and feasible—through condensation.
In this paper, I will argue that ‘‘displacement’’ and
‘‘condensation’’ are merely two examples of how psycho-
analysis as a conceptual framework, a ‘cobweb’ of con-
cepts so to speak, allows us to capture the meaning of such
events and to make sense of the whirlpool of practices,
discourses and events that make up the life sciences of1 http://www.genome.gov/10001356.
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today. The HGP and its various sequels, notably synthetic
biology, can be seen as ‘‘case studies’’ (‘‘Fallgeschichten’’),
readable in a ‘‘symptomatic’’ manner, so that psychoanal-
ysis may help us to bring to the surface—and to critically
assess—the basic desires and ambivalences of current
research endeavours: the vicissitudes of laboratory life
under the current heat wave of ‘‘Big Science’’.
Rather than presenting a comprehensive overview of
psychoanalytic theory ‘‘in general’’, or of the psychoanal-
ysis of science ‘‘as such’’ (which would involve a fairly
voluminous monograph I guess), I will opt for a much more
targeted approach, by outlining how a series of key psy-
choanalytical concepts may allow us to analyse and assess
the dynamics of the contemporary life sciences. The
‘‘contemporary life sciences’’ still constitute a fairly wide
and bewilderlingly diverse area of research, however, and
various fields involved seem to lend themselves to a psy-
choanalytical approach,—areas such as brain research or
reproductive medicine for instance. In this article, there-
fore, I will focus my attention on one particular branch of
life sciences research that has received a relatively large
amount of scientific attention—as well as research fund-
ing—during the past decade or two, namely the art of
reading and (eventually) rewriting genomes. I will study
the vicissitudes and discontents of research areas such as
genomics and synthetic biology (‘‘post genomics’’) as well
as their potentials for human existence. For every concept,
I will start my analysis with examples from genomics
(‘‘reading genomes’’), functioning as a benchmark as it
were, to subsequently shift attention to synthetic biology
(‘‘rewriting genomes’’) as a novel field. I opt for this
combination not only because I see synthetic biology (or
‘‘synbio’’, as it is often referred to) as a sequel to genomics
in various ways, but also because both fields tend to
function increasingly in combination with each other, as
the practices of reading and rewriting the building blocks
of life are bound to be intimately entangled.
Yet, even genomics and synthetic biology may appear
too complex and diverse to be dealt with sufficiently in one
paper. Therefore, after outlining the relevance of psycho-
analytical concepts for genomics and synbio (i.e. reading
and rewriting genomes) in outline, I will use a case study
approach and introduce one particular line of research
within the broader bio-synthetic arena, but highly repre-
sentative of the field (as will be explained more fully later
on), namely the development of viral biomaterials. The
basic question of this article thus is how psychoanalysis
may help us to come to terms with genomics and synthetic
biology as important components of the current revolution
in the life sciences, in particular with the societal and
bioethical implications of emerging viral materials as a
case study (Fallgeschichte), an exemplification of the new
science.
Concept 1: narcissistic insults
During the weeks and months preceding the gala televised
HGP press conference described above, the human genome
sequencing effort had turned into a massive spurt, involv-
ing competing teams who were almost dashing towards
completion.2 Humankind was about to unveil the core of its
identity, it was claimed, and the HGP was presented as an
important milestone on the way to self-knowledge—cmx9hi
reatso´m (Zwart 2007). The speeches were rather ‘‘specie-
sist’’ in that they focused almost exclusively on human
genomics (Zwart 2011) and this is remarkable, not only
because the HGP involved the sequencing of a number of
other species as well, but also because, notably from an
anthropocentric perspective, the outcomes of the HGP
seemed rather disappointing. The human genome contained
no more than *23.000 protein-coding genes, a remarkably
small number in comparison to previous estimates (which
ranged from 100,000 up to 350,000), while our genome
proved remarkably similar to the genomes of other species,
such as the chimpanzee and the laboratory mouse. We see
ourselves as a unique and fascinating species whose crea-
tivity and intelligence is unprecedented in nature, as we are
able to build and design a world, a socio-techno-cultural
environment of our of our own making, significantly
affecting the vicissitudes of life on earth as such. And yet,
although we tend to set ourselves apart from the rest of
nature, there is nothing in our genome that provides bio-
logical proof for any special status. We are the only species
on earth, as far as we can tell, that seems able to understand
and reflect on (and actively transform the conditions of) its
own evolution, the only species on earth able to sequence
its own genome, and yet there is nothing in our genome
that seems to reflect any special talents. What Francis
Fukuyama in Our posthuman future (2002) speculatively
postulated as the Factor X—‘‘A genetic endowment that
distinguishes a human in essence from other types of
creatures’’—is actually absent and cannot be found.3
Indeed, in an influential article in the New York Times,
Stephen Jay Gould (2001) called the publication of the
human sequence a ‘‘humbling’’ experience. Finally, so it
2 ‘‘The race to complete the first human genome sequence had
everything a story needs to keep its audience enthralled—right down
to a neck-and-neck sprint for the finish by two fierce rivals. In the end,
the result was basically a tie’’. (Nature 464, 1 April 2010, p. 649).
3 This mysterious ‘‘factor X’’ corresponds to what Jacques Lacan
(2004) has referred to as the ‘‘object a’’ or as ‘‘- u’’, the missing thing,
the evasive target of our will to know, the phantom-object of our
epistemic desire, something which actually is not there and cannot be
found—and therefore constitutes an issue of concern. Fukuyama’s
conviction that there simply must be a privileged set of typically and
exclusively human core genes, somehow, somewhere, is a highly
symptomatic exemplification of such as desire.
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seems, we are granted to privilege see ourselves in a mirror
that is uncontaminated with the biases of narcissism.
According to Sigmund Freud (1917/1947), all major
scientific breakthroughs are bound to entail serious narcis-
sistic offences. We initially tend to see ourselves as a unique
entity, a special ontological category, and as the centre of
the world. The Copernican revolution made it clear that we
not at all occupy a solid and central position in the universe,
but rather dwell on a lonely blue planet floating around in
godless and infinite—indeed ‘‘uncanny’’—immensities.4
The Darwinian revolution subsequently made it clear that,
biologically speaking, we are not a special kind of entity,
but simply a species among others, the outcome of a process
of evolution that will continue to shape and change us. And
finally, psychoanalysis made it clear that we are not the
autonomous masters of our own house, as by far the larger
part our mental life functions in unconscious ways.
One could argue that the HGP entails yet another nar-
cissistic insult. Our genome is not that different compared
to other species. Rather, the human genome emphasises our
basic relatedness with the rest of nature. Our genome is
simply one of the thousands of genomes that are stored in
the databases of contemporary science as digital archives
of life. Still, the focus in our research remains preferably on
our own genome, we continue to regard ourselves as our
own ‘‘favourite species’’. And even if we study the gen-
omes of other model species, such as C. elegans or the
laboratory mouse, we predominantly do so because, indi-
rectly, it is the human genome we are after.
It will not come as a surprise that we subsequently dis-
cern a similar narcissistic insult in the area of synthetic
biology as well. On the one hand, we are humbled by the
sophistication and effectiveness of the plethora of ‘‘bio-
technological’’ devices developed by nature herself which
we are only beginning to understand and appreciate and, to
a limited extent, and with a limited level of effectiveness,
employ. The basic toolboxes of biotechnology and bio-
chemistry were not created by human beings, but by
microbes in the course of evolution (notably during the
earliest stages of life). On the other hand, we still see our-
selves as agents, as entities that may consciously explore
these natural toolboxes and employ them for new purposes,
thus unleashing a new chapter in the history of both nature
and technology. Nonetheless, it seems clear that, more than
in previous, more ‘‘faustian’’ stages in the history of tech-
nology, during which we saw ourselves as engineers
regarding nature simply as a reservoir or raw materials, we
now seem to appreciate the humbling ingenuity and
sophistication of the biotechnologies of nature herself.
The American genomics pioneer of Japanese descent
Susumu Ohno (1987, 1988) has even argued that human
biotechnology basically comes down to a massive effort to
‘‘plagiarize’’ nature. Since life began a few billion years
ago, he argues, the number of true innovations in evolution
appears to have been ‘‘dismally small’’ (1987, p. 511).
Most of the successful adaptations of living organisms have
apparently been accomplished by extensive ‘‘plagiarisa-
tion’’ (idem) of those preciously few innovations via a
limited set of duplication mechanisms. Furthermore, it
appears that most of these true innovations have occurred
at the very beginning of the saga of life. In the course of
evolution, biological innovations have been duplicated to
the point of redundancy. He goes on the argue, moreover,
that the same tendency towards plagiarism pervades human
knowledge and human culture. In Ohno’s view, even
geniuses seldom invent more than one novel modus ope-
randi during their lifetime and civilization as a whole has
largely been dependent upon plagiarizing a small number
of creative innovations. Every gothic church can be
regarded as a plagiarism of the original, similar to the fact
that new genes have seldom been invented: rather, evolu-
tion involves creative re-use of what is already there.
According to Ohno, both culture (and this includes science
and technology of course) and evolution rely on extensive
plagiarisation of tested themes. And this repetition of tested
themes, he argues, has always been the hallmark of life,
both of life in general and of human existence.
A symptom of the new humbleness is the current
popularity of the concept of biomimesis (also known as
biomimicry): the alleged tendency of emerging bio-techno-
sciences to mimic and even consciously plagiarize the
biotechnologies and biomaterials nature herself has devel-
oped in the course of billions of years of evolution. Ever
since its introduction during the late 1990s, the concept of
biomimesis (or biomimetics) has become quite popular
among materials experts and synthetic biologists (Mann
1997, Bensaude-Vincent et al. 2002) and has made its
appearance in top journals, such as Nature (Ball 2001;
Sanchez et al. 2005). Bio-mimetic technologies are seen as
much more ‘‘natural’’ (more adapted to natural systems)
than previous forms of technological applications and
interventions. Novel bio-techno-sciences not only claim to
be able to permeate and explore but also to mimic and
imitate the technologies that ‘‘nature herself’’ has devel-
oped, tested and improved. The objective is to reinsert
artificial (man-made) systems in natural systems on a
molecular and micro-level in such a way that the artificial
4 ‘‘Uncanny’’ here in the literal sense of the term: ‘‘Un-heimlich’’.
The ancient Greek universe (the ‘‘cosmos’’) was regarded as a series
of protective spheres (globes) where human beings could feel
embedded and at home (Sloterdijk 1999). It is telling that Pascal,
who so eloquently voiced the frightening nature of the universe as a
limitless abyss—with his phrase ‘‘Le silence e´ternel de ces espaces
infinis m’effraie’’ (Pense´es 206/201, Pascal 1958)—is generally
regarded as the father of existentialism: the philosophy that regarded
Angst as one of the basic moods of contemporary human existence par
excellence (Cf. Lacan 2004).
340 H. Zwart
123
elements become optimally embedded. The ultimate goal is
to reintegrate the techno-sphere into the biosphere (mutual
pervasiveness of technology and nature). According to the
Sanchez et al. (2005), biomimesis is ‘‘one of the most
promising scientific and technological challenges of the
coming years’’ (p. 285). While in the past the focus was on
using technology to improve nature, nature’s ‘‘pool of
ideas’’ now increasingly becomes a source of innovation
and improvement for molecular technology. Thus biomi-
metic devices convey the intriguing (but as yet contestable)
promise of optimal interaction with their environment,
while safeguarding the integrity of human bodies and
brains. Yet, once these tool boxes of nature have been
made available, the tendency of human technology to go
beyond natural constraints is bound to manifest itself again.
Synthetic biology clearly is an exemplification of this
paradoxical trend. On the one hand, we are fascinated and
even humbled by the sophistication of the tool boxes of
nature. On the other hand, we want to enrich them and
employ them, aiming at novel targets, producing novel
entities, new biosynthetic hybrids.
The term ‘‘biotechnology’’ itself is at the heart of the
dispute. On the one hand it is often claimed that biotech-
nology is something exclusively human. From this per-
spective, the tools developed by ‘‘nature’’ and natural
species are simply seen as ‘‘biology’’, while biotechnology
is regarded as something typically belonging to us. In fact,
many authors are even more restrictive, using biotechnol-
ogy exclusively for the biotechnological repertoires that
have been developed in the context of the ‘‘biotechnolog-
ical revolution’’ (since * 1975), such as genetic modifi-
cation of crops or of research animals (such as genetically
modified laboratory mice). Others, are more reluctant to
see the development of biotechnologies as an exclusively
human thing. Regardless of one’s position in this debate,
the debate as such can be regarded as a symptom of the
‘‘narcissistic offence’’ inherent in contemporary science.
On the one hand, we simply use the techniques and path-
ways for modification developed by nature herself. On the
other hand, we often do so in unprecedented ways, so that
biotechnology allows us to redefine our specialness. We
mimic nature, but in a conscious and innovative manner,
driven by a will to knowledge, as a manifestation of our
will to (gain) power (over nature) and to emancipate our-
selves from nature.
Concept 2: biosynthetic hybrids as instances
of the Uncanny
Another concept that seems highly relevant when it comes
to understanding the current revolution is Freud’s concept
of the ‘‘uncanny’’ (‘‘Das Unheimliche’’, 1919/1947). It has
always played a role in responses to and deliberations
concerning the current life sciences revolution, also during
the genomics era. The idea is that laboratory science has
the tendency to produce monsters—grotesque as well as
beautiful ones, formidably huge as well as invincibly small
ones—behind closed doors, hybrid entities in the boundary
zone between the living and the artificial.
An telling example of a document that sets out to address
the societal implication of the genomics revolution, as a key
segment of the broader life sciences revolution, is Michael
Crichton’s world-famous novel Jurassic Park, published in
the same year in which the HGP was launched (1990). The
goal of the novel is to explore, by way of a literary exper-
iment, what will come of this new scientific power when it
falls in the hands of scientifically trained pioneers and
entrepreneurs. The focus this time is on the animal realm.
What would it mean if extinct species, by sequencing,
reconstructing and cloning (that is: de-coding and rewrit-
ing) their paleo-DNA, could be reanimated and brought to
life again, thereby turning dinosaurs into research animals
and palaeontology into an experimental ethology?
Extinct Jurassic species, re-emerging in the era of the
technical reproducibility of life, would certainly represent the
category of the uncanny and the monstrous, not only because
of their enormity and formidable bulk, but also because these
living specimens are biotechnological hybrids: they find
themselves somewhere in the intermediary zone between the
natural and the artificial. They are at the same time extremely
wild animals and man-made laboratory products.
The Frankenstein-scenario or Frankenstein-complex, as it
was originally conceived by Mary Shelley in her classic
novel (Wollstonecraft Shelley 1818/1968), basically reflects
that, from the beginning of the 19th century onwards,5 life
scientists have been engaged in producing novel entities
(biotechnological hybrids) that sooner or later are introduced
in the life world and in society, with unforeseen, but initially
often harmful, consequences. This not only applies to
modified microbes or modified mice, but would also go for
reanimated extinct species. Indeed, even the first children
born with the help of IVF were ‘‘heralded’’ as ‘‘Frankenstein
babies’’ in the 1970s (Turney 1998).
5 The Famous passage in the Introduction to her novel, where she
described her dream about a young scientists who has finally managed
to put his artificial but living ‘‘thing’’ together, can be regarded as the
Ur-Scene, the primordial scene of the contemporary life sciences: My
imagination, unbidden, possessed and guided me, gifting the succes-
sive images that arose in my mind with a vividness far beyond the
usual bonds of reverie. I saw—with shut eyes, but acute mental
vision—I saw the pale student of unhallowed arts kneeling beside the
thing he had put together. I saw the hideous phantasm of a man
stretched out, and then, on the working of some powerful engine,
show signs of life, and stir with an uneasy, half-vital motion. Frightful
must it be… His success would terrify the artist; he would rush away
from his odious handiwork, horror-stricken. He would hope that, left
to itself, the slight spark of life which he had communicated would
fade… (p. 263/264).
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This ‘‘complex’’ is also at the heart of Crichton’s intriguing
novel. Millions of years after their extinction, posthumously
as it were, the dinosaurs are suddenly invited into the man-
made Ark (in the form of a privately-owned tropical island) in
order to survive the great deluge, the great wave of mass
extinction that wiped them off the face of the earth after all.
This involves them in a process of domestication: the taming
of the monster. In the case of Crichton’s novel, two types of
preventive measures, instances of policies of containment,
have been taken in order to make the world immune, as it
were, against collateral dinosaur damage. First of all, a par-
ticular gene has been knocked-out, deleted from the code, so
that the dinosaurs are unable to sufficiently feed themselves,
without support from humans. Without special food ingredi-
ents, provided by their human caretakers, they would be
unable to survive. Thus, they cannot really be regarded as
wild type dinosaurs. They are turned into Mangelwesen as it
were (Gehlen 1962), to keep them in place.
From a psychoanalytical viewpoint one could say that
this is done to keep them perpetually in a situation of oral
dependence, depriving them of the possibility to develop
into mature, adult individuals who can take care of them-
selves. They are subject to a policy of genome-based ani-
mal husbandry. Humans try to stay in control by employing
a form of ‘‘pastoral power’’: these monsters are to remain
dependent on us as their feeders and keepers forever. Yet,
as becomes apparent in the course of the novel, the
designers and re-animators of these test animals have
underestimated the creativity of life. Living beings are
problem-solvers, and living entities will find a way out,
there will always be surrogates and alternatives somewhere
along the road to independence and freedom.
The second preventive measure is the decision to select
only the female eggs, so that the theme Park is inhabited by
female versions of dinosaurs only. This is another major
effort that is employed in order to domesticate the monster.
Not in the sense that females are more easily to tame or
handle, or something like that (on the contrary, in Crich-
ton’s novel it is stated that female dinosaurs are actually
stronger and more dangerous than their male counterparts),
but again in the sense that they are deprived of the possi-
bility to become adult living beings. This time, they are
deprived of the possibility to reproduce. Psychoanalytically
speaking, the decision to only allow specimen of one of the
two sexes to mature, means that an important link in the
pathway of reproduction is lacking, so that the inhabitants
of the Park represent a ‘‘castrated’’ version of the original
(Jurassic) dinosaur community. The reproductive organ the
constitutes the bridge between two sets of DNA as it were
is missing. The human stewards in this artificial Jurassic
paradise want to remain in control, they are the only ones
entitled to select and fertilize the eggs and they do not want
to grant this right to the dinosaurs themselves. In
Frankenstein, the archetypical monster of the modern life
sciences par excellence is in a similar manner deprived of
the possibility to reproduce when Victor Frankenstein
decides to destroy the female version he promised (and
almost managed) to create. By being able to reproduce, the
dinosaurs would be awarded the right to take their evolu-
tion, their destiny, in their own hands, they would begin to
reproduce and migrate like any other species and would
populate and colonize the world on their own accord.
The alternative scenario, an autonomously reproducing
dinosaur community, would present a rather uncanny
prospect. By way of an oedipal revolt, these biotech
monsters, as soon as they are able to procreate, would
increasingly ignore the plans their creators originally had in
stall for them. They would evolve from a tourist park
attraction into a biological species in search of an optimal
habitat, no longer instrumental to anthropocentric pur-
poses. In the case of carnivores, they will see us simply as
edible mammals, as prey, rather than as stewards. This is
something to forego. But again, nature proves more flexible
and creative that the designers of the Park presumed. The
dinosaurs simply change their sex, as amphibian species in
nature under certain circumstances do, and thus reassume
control over their own reproduction. They differentiate into
two sexes, assuming adult male and female identities, from
a psychoanalytical perspective an important oedipal move
on the road towards biological self-determination.
Perhaps even more than in the case of genomics, which is
basically about reading and reproducing existing genomes,
the category of the uncanny applies to emerging biosynthetic
hybrids of the synthetic biology revolution. According to
Freud, the category of the uncanny becomes relevant as soon
as the borderline between the living and the non-living,
between the natural and the artificial, becomes blurred, and
this seems to apply to the plethora of artificial, biomimetic
contrivances, bioimplants, biosensors and other synbio
products that are currently being designed worldwide.
Again, rather than acting as mere artefacts that will simply
function as we intended them to function, they may sooner or
later begin to live a life, a career of their own, entering the
tissues and arteries of society. Sooner or later, they may pose
a threat to the integrity of human bodies and brains.
Increasingly, our brains and bodies may be endangered by
the intrusion of pervading and invading biomimetical
devices produced by new combinations of the building
blocks of life. But I will flesh out this scenario in more detail
when discussing the case study of viral materials later on.
Like Jurassic Park and its sequel The lost world, the
novel Next (2006), the last novel Michael Crichton pub-
lished before his death, is a genomics novel, but now the
focus has shifted from the animal realm (animal well-being
and behaviour) to the human realm (biomedical and per-
sonal health issues). In this novel it is fleshed out how, due
342 H. Zwart
123
to the current biorevolution, human individuals are
becoming the managers of their own health status, of their
own biographies. Increasingly, individuals begin to see
themselves as genome entrepreneurs, using personal gen-
ome information as their starting capital as it were, whilst
human bodies are redefined as reservoirs of highly valuable
resources (genes, cells, tissues and the like as entities with
market value). Yet, in this novel, the highly dramatic,
exotic and spectacular, Discovery Channel-like ambiance
of Jurassic Park has given way to the atmosphere of a
Soap. In displaying individuals on their hunt for genes that
may explain, or help them to improve, their personality and
their conduct, the reading and rewriting of genomes has
evolved into something highly trivial and banal. Yet, this
may mean that the uncanny (literally: the un-homely, das
Unheimliche) is well on its way to become domesticated
and embedded, so that the art of decoding and recomposing
genomes has already begun to enter ordinary life.
Concept 3: pandemics of technology
Uncanny biotechnological hybrids are not only threatening
entities in themselves, they are even more intimidating
because, sooner or later, they are bound to escape from the
laboratory, they will get out of control, thus quickly
evolving into a scourge for humanity at large. Indeed, as
Ulrich Beck (1992) has argued, in contrast to earlier
epochs, the hazards and catastrophes of contemporary bi-
osocieties are induced and introduced by the techno-
sciences themselves. We already noticed that biotech
hybrids and similar monsters have the tendency to prolif-
erate, to spread. In other words, the monster-archetype
tends to be closely associated with a proxy archetype,
namely that of the man-made, biotechnological pandemic,
involving novel biomimetic artefacts that, after their
incubation period in contained laboratory settings, will
invade and inflame societal realms, niches and tissues on a
massive scale. New biosynthetic entities are first intro-
duced in special protected environments or niches (such as
research laboratories, but also specialized hospitals and
military facilities), but are bound to spread and disseminate
from there sooner or later into society and daily life.
Sooner or later, they will become highly pervasive.
The genomics revolution itself resulted from a kind of
technological contagion, the massive proliferation and
spread of high throughput sequencing facilities throughout
laboratory networks worldwide. And now, during the years
to come, a wave of genomics information will begin to affect
health care through biobanking and personal genome infor-
mation. For synthetic biology, this archetype will even be
more pertinent, so it seems. New synthetic bio-objects will
spread through the realms and tissues of society, quickly
evolving, assuming unpredicted roles and functions, used by
various groups of users for unintended purposes, taking on a
life of their own. Immunization policies in the form of reg-
ulatory regimes will have to be put in place to contain and
govern the turbulence of these developments.
The pandemic archetype is notably relevant because
synthetic biology is an important part of the emerging field
of do-it-yourself biology (Wohlsen 2011; Cf. Penders
2011). Professional laboratories increasingly seem to lose
their monopoly over the production of synthetic bioprod-
ucts (provided, that is, that such a monopoly ever existed).
Biohackers may well create an online open-source global
supermarket for synthetic biological entities or ingredients.
Or, as Wohlsen puts it: Biopunk carries the message that
slowly, steadily, we could all become authors of a ubiq-
uitous and ‘‘democratic’’ biology. Thus, a synbio version of
the self-help movement for a broad variety of self-
empowered individuals, using genetically modified viral or
microbial colonies in vitro for brewing their own home-
made opium, Prozac or Ritalin, may well be awaiting us.
But I will further elaborate this prospect in the context of
my case study: the emergence of viral materials.
Viral biomaterials: a case study
My case study concerns an ongoing interdisciplinary col-
laborative project of philosophers of science with
researchers of the Institute for Molecules and Materials
(IMM) at the Faculty of Science, Radboud University
Nijmegen, the Netherlands.6 IMM studies how viruses can
be used for producing biomaterials. By adding gene seg-
ments to plant viruses, self-replicating, biomimetic
enzymes can be generated, for instance for producing
cellular energy (ATP), hormones (such as testosterone or
EPO), various vital enzymes (such as insulin), neuro-
transmitters (such as dopamine) or bodily tissues (such as
bone or muscle tissue). Viruses can not only be used for
storage and transport of genetic material, but also as
scaffolds, reaction vessels, nanotemplates or synthetic
platforms for producing self-replicating compounds or for
self-assembling enzymes and catalytic products that stim-
ulate various cellular processes. Enzymes encapsulated in a
virus can be used for biodetection or for setting up self-
assembling systems for producing composite materials
such as bodily tissues. Thus, along the lines of biomimesis,
6 IMM is an interdisciplinary research institute of international
prominence, active in areas ranging from nanoscience to biochemical
synthesis. Its mission is to understand and manipulate properties of
functional molecules and materials. In 2010, the Nobel Prize for
physics was awarded to Andre Geim (former associate professor and
currently extraordinary professor at IMM) and Konstantin Novoselov
(for his Ph.D. research conducted at IMM) for their work on
graphene.
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‘‘nature’s own approach’’ (self-assembly) is used to pro-
duce a broad variety of biomolecules (Carette et al. 2007;
Comellas-Aragone´s et al. 2007). It is a key example of how
bionanoscience is about to pervade human bodies.
To give a concrete example of what this means, in the
case of patients suffering from Parkinson’s disease, or
identified (on the basis of their personal genome) as being at
a risk for developing this neurodegenerative affliction, viral
implants may be inserted into the substantia nigra of their
brain to produce dopamine, either for therapy or for pre-
vention. Thus, patients suffering from degenerative and as
yet incurable diseases may be provided with new options
and prospects for the future. Yet, this is merely one example
and as viral biomaterials constitute a generic approach, they
can be applied to a broad variety of purposes, for therapy
and prevention (in clinical settings), but also for ‘‘perfor-
mance enhancement’’. Thus, besides therapeutic applica-
tions, various options for healthy individuals may come into
view as well, notably in the context of special professions
(involving individuals exposed to extraordinary risks) such
as the military and top athletes. Soldiers of the future may
be equipped with biosensors (miniaturised biomimetic
sensing devices) for discerning ultra-red light (body heath)
in the dark, or with self-replicating systems for wound
healing. Top athletes may (either for purposes of injury
prevention, or for performance enhancement, or both) use
micro-implants to produce hormones (such as EPO) or
strengthen particular tissues at risk. In short, a plethora of
options is emerging and the boundaries between therapy,
prevention and enhancement are bound to become
increasingly blurred. The societal divide may increase
between those who are informed or affluent enough to use
these applications to manage their mental and physical
condition, or even strengthen their performance, and those
who are less willing or able to do so.
Yet, these emerging bio-ethical issues must be addressed
against the backdrop of a broader perspective. The case
could be made that we are entering a new chapter in the
history of human embodiment. So far, technology basically
produced protheses in the form of visible ‘‘extensions’’ or
replacements that allowed human beings to transform
themselves from an unfinished, and therefore still highly
plastic, Mangelwesen (Gehlen 1962) into an optimally
adapted entity: modern human beings functioning in a
complex environment of their own making. Now, tech-
nology is taking a new ‘‘Turn’’, in the heideggerian sense
of the term, by entering our brains and bodies on a
molecular and microscopic level and by producing bio-
implants that may become intimately embedded.
The optimalisation of eye sight may be used as an
example here of how technology is currently evolving:
from a pair of highly visible glasses covering the eyes
(classical optics), via virtually invisible plastic contact
lenses (already touching the surface of the eye), to laser
treatment, up to embedded biomaterial implants in the lens
or retina—perhaps even in parts of the brain associated
with visual functioning. Thus, novel artefacts are entering
and about to nestle themselves in our sense organs and
eventually maybe even in our neural networks. Actually, in
the essay in which the concept of the uncanny is developed,
Freud (1919/1947) himself pays special attention to human
eyes, using as his key exemplification of the uncanny a
Hoffmann story about a young student who falls in love
with someone because of her mysteriously attractive and
fascinating, but artificial eye-balls.
To what extent can psychoanalytical concepts allow us to
assess the emerging issues in synthetic biological approaches
to human health such as the case of viral material implants? I
will ‘‘apply’’ the three (highly interrelated) concepts in the
same order in which they were introduced above.
The narcissistic offence
With viral implants appearing on the horizon, the human
body seems besieged. Closely related to narcissism and the
narcissistic offence is the emphasis on the integrity or
inviolability of the human body. There is a certain sense of
Apollonian and aesthetic completeness, wholeness and
soundness attached to our intuitive elevation of the human
torso, female or male. At first glance, we seem perfectly
finished, we do not seem to be lacking anything,—a nar-
cissistic appraisal grounded in what Lacan (1966) referred
to as the ‘‘mirror’’ experience. Yet, whenever human
bodies are opened up, by surgery, by anatomical dissection,
by an MRI-scan, or by any other biomedical devices, a
slightly different perspective emerges. Whenever our
blurry, visceral insides, our intestines are revealed, more or
less uncanny and narcissistically insulting images may
emerge, such as the view of the human body functioning as
a mere machine, or as a biochemical plant producing huge
amounts of waste, besides a large number of functional
biochemical products, or as a kind of ecosystem inhabited
by millions of micro-organisms who actually are respon-
sible for the broad range of processes we traditionally
summarize under the heading of ‘‘metabolism’’. Thus,
rather than seeing human as ‘‘individuals’’ (literally: indi-
visible entities),7 the human body seems submerged in the
biochemical processes of life, and the human as a ‘‘person’’
or ‘‘subject’’ tends to disappear from view. In fact, the
integrity of our bodies has been violated since time
immemorial, by the constant influx of viral and microbial
life forms, unconsciously, without our awareness, let alone
7 Not only the term ‘‘individual’’, also the term ‘‘integrity’’ etymo-
logically refers to the wholeness of the human body.
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our consent. In the era of synthetic biology, the idea
emerges that nature (human bodies) on the one hand and
technology (pharmaceuticals, prostheses and implants) on
the other do not constitute a dichotomy, but should rather
be seen as a ‘‘Dionysian’’ continuum: the human body as a
pool of chemicals and as a reactor vessel for myriads of
biochemical processes. Our body emerges as a complex,
interactive system, rather than as a sculpture. And parts of
this system may be re-written or re-designed as our systems
are mixtures of sophistication and flaws, of functional and
dysfunctional elements.
Moreover, ours is an era in which societal demands and
expectations in terms of physical condition, longevity,
physical attractiveness, cognitive and physical performance
and the like tend to become increasingly severe. Rather than
via Darwinian selection, which is a notoriously slow, tedious
and violent process, we will try to meet these demands by
actively working on ourselves, through improvement and
repair. Health is the temporary outcome of a process that may
increasingly be in need of input from contemporary bio-
technosciences. We are open for improvement. And viral
implants may be seen as providing an optimal set of vectors
for such a view of ourselves. We may continue to work on
ourselves in a fine-grained, technologically sophisticated
manner. Rather than poisoning our whole system with tra-
ditional drugs, alcohol, psychopharmaceutics or tranquiliz-
ers, we may enact our repair or improvement work ‘‘on site’’,
on a microscopic level. On the one hand, we acknowledge
that we are Mangelwesen, in need of corrective interven-
tions, and that our microbial processes are quite similar than
those of viruses, microbes, or other forms of life. On the other
hand, we can still see ourselves as special and unprece-
dented, namely as the only form of life that is actually able to
see itself as ‘‘unfinished’’ and therefore really able to actively
manage and rewrite the scores of its own life. And this may
give rise to the concern, voiced by Fukuyama (2002) and
others, that we currently run the risk of deploying technol-
ogies that are the products of our intelligence and freedom (of
‘‘human nature’’), to undermine the very basis (genetically,
neurologically and otherwise) of this intelligence and free-
dom: human nature under siege.
The uncanny
The uncanny, the second concept discussed above, is closely
related to narcissism, as we have seen. As Freud explains in
his article, the category of the uncanny notably applies to
hybrid life forms, boundary elements between the natural
and the artificial, the human and the animal, the living and
the non-living. From this perspective, viral life forms are
already highly interesting in themselves as candidates that
may optimally exemplify the uncanny as an ontological
category. Constituting the boundary zone between the living
and the non-living, viruses are already an exemplification of
this idea. They are by definition an item of uneasiness and
concern. They are alive, but continuously mimicking and
parasitizing upon their favourite model species. Our immune
system, indeed: the human corpus as such (almost com-
pletely covered by a protective layer of skin), seems
designed with the explicit purpose of keeping them out.
What an uncanny idea, then, to invite them in, in the form of
viral biomaterials. The use of viral biomaterials would
constitute a new wave of viral and microbial infusions and
invasions, after vaccination and similar biomedical tech-
niques that were introduced in the era of Pasteur and Koch.
Like the macro-monsters of Jurassic Park, we may
believe that we will be able to contain them, keep them in
place, but we know from experience that viruses are flex-
ible, adaptive and creative, and evolving at a very high
pace. Moreover, we know (and this is one of the narcis-
sistic offences to which we are exposed) that we are not
really in-dividuals in the sense of stand-alone entities, but
rather inhabited by a plethora of viral and microbial life
forms. How will new viral entities interact with our
inhabited bodies as their environment? Will they awaken
for instance the retroviral sleeping beauties slumbering in
our nuclei? The genome itself is an archive that contains
the traces of a long history of invasions of nomadic viral
life forms, entering our cells, and even the nuclei of our
cells. A huge part of what was formerly known as junk-
DNA contains the traces and sediments of previous viral
experiments. A new chapter in this dramatic history seems
to be unleashed under the heading of synthetic biology.
Yet, at the same time, this knowledge can also be used
to emphasize that the introduction of viral materials into
human bodies, albeit intentional this time, is really nothing
new. It is simply part of the drama of life, although we now
intend to do it in a targeted and tailored manner.
The archetype of the biotechnological pandemic
Finally, there is the apprehension that novel synthetic bio-
products such as viral biomaterials may become something
of a biotechnological pandemic. This is connected to the
archetype associated with the biomedical field as such, the
idea of a iatrogenic infection, cause by an agent that is put
into this world on purpose by biomedical experts them-
selves, with the best of intentions no doubt, but with
unforeseen consequences in terms of collateral damage.
The idea is that, as viral biomaterials enter various societal
environments, will imbue the valves and tissues of society,
they will begin to evolve in various directions, they will be
adapted by various users for unforeseen and unintended
and at times contentious goals. Patients suffering from
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degenerative diseases and top athletes will act as pioneers.
They are the ‘‘test animals’’ of our biosocieties as it were,
who expose their own bodies to novel options and ideas.
They will be the first to allow viral implants to enter their
bodies and brains. Gradually, these therapies may spread to
other patients groups as well as healthy individuals, so that
therapy gradually gives way to enhancement.
Conclusion and prospects for the future
Analysing contemporary biomedical technosciences through
the lens of a psychoanalytic conceptual framework is a
revealing and rewarding exercise, notably when these con-
cepts are employed during the exploratory stages of assess-
ment, with a focus on newly emerging technoscientific fields,
for the purpose of elucidation as it were. As the technosciences
at hand continue to evolve, however, these psychoanalytical
concepts will increasingly become connected with more
concrete bioethical issues and deliberations as well, in various
ways. The concept of the narcissistic offence, for instance, but
also the concept of the uncanny, will notably prove relevant
for bioethical deliberations concerning the integrity and
inviolability of the human body, as well as for reflections on
the implications these developments may have for human
autonomy and self-determination. As the genetic and bio-
molecular basis for autonomy and bodily integrity is being
challenged and redefined, a psychoanalytical reading may
allow us to reconsider en reframe the basic content of these
key bioethical concepts. The concept of the synbio pandemic,
on the other hand, is predominantly connected with issues
such as justice and risk. Justice because on the one hand it may
strengthen the democratization of new technologies as soon as
they leave the professional laboratories of top research groups
or high tech industries and enter our kitchens and garages,
while on the other hand it may deepen the divide between the
literate and illiterate in terms of self-management and the
prospects offered by synthetic biology in this respect. Risks
because of the difficulties in predicting and governing the
future evolution of these technologies in societal environ-
ments. This paper presents the building blocks or basic
ingredients for what may evolve into a more comprehensive
psychoanalytic reading of the contemporary biomedical and
bio-molecular life sciences.
Acknowledgments this article builds on papers presented at the
SYBHEL Conference ‘‘Synthetic Biology & Human Health: Conceptual
Foundations, Methodology & Ethical Frameworks’’ (Bristol, 27–28 June
2011) and at the 25th European Conference on Philosophy of Medicine
and Health Care (Zu¨rich, 17–20 August, 2011). The research presented is
part of the Centre for Society and Genomics Research Programme CSG
Next, funded by the Netherlands Genomics Initiative (NGI).
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License which
permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
References
Ball, P. 2001. Life’s lessons in design. Nature 409: 413–416.
Beck, U. 1992. Risk slociety: Towards a new modernity. London: Sage.
Bensaude-Vincent, B., H. Arribart, Y. Bouligand, and C. Sanchez. 2002.
Chemists and the school of nature. New Journal of Chemistry 1: 1–5.
Carette, N., R. Nolte, J. van Hest, et al. 2007. A virus-based
biocatalyst. Nature nanotechnology 2: 226–229.
Collins, F. 2010. Has the revolution arrived? Nature 646(7289):
674–675.
Comellas-Aragone´s, M., R. Nolte, et al. 2007. A virus capsid based
nanoreactor. Nature Nanotechnology 2: 635–639.
Crichton, M. 1990/1991. Jurassic Park. London: Arrow/random house.
Crichton, M. 2006. Next. New York: Harper Collins.
de Duve, C. 2002. Life evolving. Molecules, mind and meaning.
Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.
Freud, S. 1900/1942. Die Traumdeutung. Gesammelte Werke II/III.
London: Imago.
Freud, S. 1917/1947. Eine Schwierigkeit der Psychoanalyse. Gesam-
melte Werke XII. London: Imago, pp. 3–12.
Freud, S. 1919/1947. Das Unheimliche. Gesammelte Werke XII.
London: Imago.
Fukuyama, F. 2002. Our posthuman future. Consequences of the
biotechnology revolution. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Gehlen, A. 1962. Der Mensch. Seine Natur und seine Stellung in der
Welt. Frankfurt/Bonn: Athena¨um.
Gould, S.J. 2001. Humbled by the genome’s mysteries. USA: New
York Times, February 19.
Hayden, E. 2010. Human genome at ten: Life is complicated. Nature
464: 664–667.
Lacan, J. 1966. E´crits. Paris: E´ditions du Seuil.
Lacan, J. 2004. Le Se´minaire 10: L’angoisse. Paris: E´ditions du Seuil.
Mann, S. 1997. Biomimetic materials chemistry. New York: Wiley.
Noble, D. 2006. The music of life: Biology beyond the genome.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ohno, S. 1987. Repetition as the essence of life on this earth.
Hematology and Blood Transfusion 31: 511–518.
Ohno, S. 1988. On periodicities governing the construction of genes
and proteins. Animal Genetics 19: 305–316.
Pascal, B. 1958. Pense´es (2 tomes). Paris: Hachette.
Penders, B. 2011. DIY biology (book review). Nature 472: 167.
Sanchez, C., H. Arribart, and M.M. Giraud Guille. 2005. Biomim-
etism and bioinspiration as tools for the design of innovative
materials and systems. Nature Materials 4: 277–288.
Sloterdijk, P. 1999. Spha¨ren II: Globen. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
Turney, J. 1998. Frankenstein’s footsteps: Science, genetics and
popular culture. New Haven & London: Yale University Press.
Wohlsen, M. 2011. Biopunk: DIY scientists hack the software of life.
New York: Barnes & Noble.
Wollstonecraft Shelley, M. 1818/1968. Frankenstein; or, the modern
prometheus. In Three gothic novels, ed. Fairclough, P, Har-
mondsworth: Penguin.
Zwart, H. 2007. Genomics and self-knowledge. Implications for societal
research and debate. New Genetics and Society 26(2): 181–202.
Zwart, H. 2009. From utopia to science: challenges of personalised
genomics information for health management and health
enhancement. Medicine Studies 1(2): 155–166.
Zwart, H. 2011. Towards an eco-centric view of human existence:
Implications of genomics for the environmental zone. Genomics,
Society and Policy 6(2): 40–55.
346 H. Zwart
123
